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Introduction 
At the outset of a discussion of monetary integration , the 
characteristics that are essentia l for a monetary union as well as those 
necessary for the continued and successful existence of the monetary 
union must be considered . 
First, in any monetary union , either there must be a sing l e 
currency, or if there are several currencies , these currencies must be 
fully convertible, one into another , at immutably fixed exch ange rates 
thus e f fectively creating a single currency. 
Second , the immutability of fixed exchange rates depends upon 
mutually consistent monetary policies within the union . Thus, there 
must be an arrangement whereby monetary policy for the union , especially 
regulations affecting the commercial banks ' ability to create money, is 
determined at the union level. 
Finally, there must be a single external exchange rate po l icy, 
because there can be only one rate of exchange bet ween an ext erna l 
currency and the union currency. To achieve such an end , the nationa l 
authorities must relinquish individual contro l over their inter nat i onal 
reserves and invest control i n a union authority . 
These th r ee requirements - effectively a single currency, a sing l e 
union monetary policy , union control of international reserves and the 
external ex change rate - are regarded here as essential for an 
arrangement to qualify as a monetary union. 
It is necessary to realize from t he beginning that the political 
commitment to achieve the goals of ' a European monetary system must be 
present . In other words, the national sovere i gnty member nations turn 
over to union authority and the extent national policies and performance 
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are brought into greater harmony will determine whether a monetary union 
stands or falls . 
In economic terms, the choice be t ween these two positions is the 
choice between maximiz i ng a union welfare function or some weigh t ed 
average of separate welfare functions. If the member countries are 
sufficiently integrated to have adopted a union welfare function for 
some purpose, the question of whether to centralize the relevant policy 
becomes largely a question of efficiency. On the other hand, if 
countries are maximizing their individual national welfare functions, 
the desirability of centralizing a policy depends , for each nation, upon 
the gains from cooperation compared with the cost of compromise. 
Obviously , no nation will be willing to become a member unless they are 
to be no worse off than before. The function to be maximized is thus 
constrained by initial welfare levels. The advantages and disadvantages 
for each nation of adoption of a common currency are examined below. 
A Chronology of the European Economic Communities' 
Attempt at Monetary Union 
On March 25 , 1957, the Benelux countries, France Germany, and Italy 
signed the Treaty of Rome and established the European Economic 
Community. The treaty came into force on April 1, 1958. Since 1958, 
Britain, Ireland, Denmark, and Greece have joined the community. 
The EEC extended the common market principles of the European Coal 
and Steel Community by abolishing quotas on goods and services by 
eliminating obstacles to the movement of people and capital, and 
creating institutions with supranationa l powers. 1 
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It was believed form the outset, to achieve the goa l s of the Common 
Market a stable mon_etary framework must be conceived and· implemented. 
Articles 104~109 of the Rome Treaty autho r ized the formation of a 
Monetary Committee to monitor capital movements and exchange rate 
fluctuations between member states . In 1962 the Monetary Conmiittee 
issued a memorandum suggesting a two - stage program by which the monetary 
policy of member countries would become closer aligned . 2 To accomplish 
this objective, a committee of the governo r s of the central banks was 
created to discuss and obse rve moneta ry policy of member countries. In 
1964 the Committee of Governors of Central Banks was created, and it was 
agreed that member countries should coordinate their action in 
internationa l monetary affairs. 
Although intact and well - intentioned, neither the Governors of th e 
Central Banks nor the Monetary Commit t ee was able to forestall the 
string of intern al monetary events that took place from 1967 to 1971. 
The events incl uded: 
1967 , November: 
1968, .March: 
1968 , May: 
1968 , Fall -
1969, Spring: 
1969, August : 
1969 , Octobe r : 
1969: 
1970-1971: 
Devaluation of the pound 
Two-tier go l d market 
Events in France 
Short term capital on the move, 
especially from France to Germany 
Devaluation o f the French franc 
Revaluation of the Deutsche mark 
Dol l ar scarcity owing to high interest 
rates in the Euro - dol lar market 
Reflow of short-term capital to Euro pe as 




The mark and the florin float 
The Dollar became inconvertible 
During .this period of instabi lity , two very important plans were 
submitted to the European Commission dealing with plans for monetary 
policy coordination and ultimately monetary union (linking exchange 
parties or a common currency). The first submitted was the Barre Plan 
3 on Februa ry 1, 1969. The Barre Plan advocated: (a) compulsory 
consultation between member states whenever important short-term 
economic policy decisions varied from agreed~upon medium term 
?bjectives, and (b) a net work of short- and medium-term financial 
assistance to finance balance of payments equilibrium. 4 
The Hague Summit in December of 1969 and the resulting Werner Group 
repo rt is credited with the original plan for economic and monetary 
un ion within the Comrnunity. 5 The final report was submitted in October 
of 1970 and accep t ed by the Commission in March of 1971. The European 
Commission stated an intent to realize a common European currency by 
1980. · The move was fostered by a re quest to Central Banks to begin 
"narr owing the margins" between member currencies and to submit a report 
on the prospect fo r a "European Fund". As a result of the Werner Plan, 
the Council resolved in March of 1972 to reduce the margins between 
member currencies from a limit of 4.5 to 2.25% {hence, the so-called 
"Snake" was created) and to proceed with progressive fiscal 
harmonization and liberalization of capital movements. 6 
Considerable currency fluctuations tested the "Snake" arrangement 
th~oughou t 1973, ostensibly as the result of worldwide economic 
instability. By the end of 1973, th ree members {Ireland, Italy, U.K.) 
were no longer participating in the arrangement. This period was also 
4 
characterized by intense pressure on the U.S. dollar. It was devalued 
for the second time on February .12, 1973 by 10%. As a result of the 
dev a luation, the member countries within the EEC still participating in . 
the Snake agreed to try to maintain the 2.25% band between their own 
currencies, but to allow the band to float on a "managed" basis against 
h 11 h 
. 7 
t e do ar and ot er currencies. 
Since 1974 foreign exchange rates have continued to fluctuate 
(although in a "managed" float) in response to many diverse fa _ctors, 
among them: dif f ering national inflation rates , interest rate differen -
tials , structural shifts in the balance of payments, and outright 
speculation. In reality, the international monetary system since 1974 
has been characterized by a confusing mixture of freely floating, 
managed floating, and fixed rates. In February of 1977 the 
International Monetary Fund reported that of the 129 countries reported 
upon, 34 were freely floating, 88 currencies were tied or pegged to some 
other currency, and seven member countries of the EEC were members of 
the European common margins arrangement ("snake" ). 8 
The European Monetary System (EMS) 
On December 5, 1978 , the European Council adopted a resolution 
based on the reco mmen dations of the Council of Ministries and the 
Committee of Governors of the Central Banks which cleared the way for 
9 the entry into force of the European Monetary System . The 
implementation of EMS on March 13 , 1979 represents the most tangible 
manifestation to date of the EEC' s resolve to achieve monetary union 
within the Community. To facilitate the process the ECU was designed as 
a forerunner for a European currency. 
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The EMS is , in reality, a complex exchange rate and intervention 
system combined wi~h large credit facilities . The proponents of EMS say 
that it will lead to a zone of monetary stability in Eur ope and a 
greater " convergence " of financial and economic policies in participating 
countries. In fact, . in September of 1981 , the Italian government ruled 
that the ECU should be accepted as an official currency . 
The "numeraire " for the system, the ECU (European Currency Unit), 
is a composite of nine common market members' currencies. I t is used as 
the denominator for operations under both the intervention and credit 
mechanisms and for transactions of the European Monetary Cooperation 
Fund ; and as a means of settlement between monetary authorities of the 
Community member countries . Additionally, since 1981 the ECO has 
accounted for the equivalent of $1 . 995 billion of issues in the Eurobond 
market. John van Schil, deputy manager of the European investment ban k , 
recently estimated that interbank deposits in ECU's equals between $8.S 
billion and $13 billion. 
Interest in the ECU is growing outside European central banks . An 
indication of this is the fact t hat a group of European commercial 
banks, a U. S. bank and various EEC agencies are formalizing a clearing 
system fo r ECU. 
The ECU consists of a basket of fixed amounts of the nine 
currencies · of the Community's members . Each currency participating in 
t he El-IS has a central r ate in terms of ECU' s . These central rates 
determ i ne a grid of bilatera l central rate s, around which margins of+ 
2 . 25 per cent have been es t ab l ished. The currency weights in the ECU 
can be observed from the table below: 
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Value of EC Currencies In Terms Of 
The European Currency Unit (ECU) 
Old* New** Percentage 
Belgian/Luxembourg 
franc 44.9704 44 . 3662 +1.5 
Danish krone 8.2340 8.0441 +2.5 
Gennan mark 2.3338 2 . 2151 +5.5 
French franc 6.6139 6.7927 - 2.5 
Italian lire 1,350 . 2700 1,336.7800 -2.5 
Irish pound 0.69101 0.71705 - 3.5 
Netherlands guilder 2 . 5797 2.4959 +3.5 
* Established June 14, 1982. 
** Established March 21, 19 83 . 
Absolute Currency Percentage Share 
currency Amounts per ECU Individual Currencies 
Belgian francs 3 . 66 . 4.1 
Danish kroners 0.217 2.7 
German marks 0.828 37.4 
French francs 1.15 16.9 
Italian lire 109.0 7 . 9 
Irish pounds 0 . 00759 1.1 
Netherlands guilders 0.286 11.5 
Luxenbourg francs 0.14 4.2 
British pounds 0 . 0885 14.1 
Change 
per ECU 
Source: In ternational Letter , Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, No. 495. 
The weight of the currencies in the ECU are based on the gross national 
product and world trade shares of European Community members. 
It was decided at a meeting of the European Council in Breman on 
July 6-7, 1978, that no automatic revision in the composition of the 
basket for the ECU would occur i= there were changes in central rates 
within the EMS or in the exc hang e rates of member countries not partici-
pating in the EMS. However, the weights of the currencies will be 
re-examined and , if necess ary, revised within six months of the entry 
into force of the EMS, and thereafter eve r y five years . On request , 
they may also be changed if the percentage share of any currency, based 
on actual exchange rates, has changed by 25 percent or more. 
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An IHF survey of April 20, 1981 reported: Belgium, Denmark , France , 
Germany, Ire l and, italy, Luxe~bourg, and the Netherlands are participa-
ting in the EMS and maintain ~aximum margins of 2 . 25 (in the case of the ·. 
Italian lira 6%) for exchange · rate transactions in the official markets 
between their currencies and those of the other countries in this group. 
It should be noted that there are a number of mechanical and 
technical procedures which have not been discussed above. Such measures 
as the "divergence indicator " (a formula to "flash" currency divergencies) 
and diversified interven tion are beyond the intentions of this study. 
What can, however, be observed from the EMS is the EEC's " firm 
reso l ve to ensure the l asting success of the EMS by policies conducive 
to greater stability at home and abroad for both deficit and surplus 
countries." Time has already proven the ECU to be the most viable 
exchange rate arrangement in the history of European monetary integra -
tion. The Ins tituto Bancario San Paolo di Turino recent l y showed ·that 
during the 18 nonths beginning in January of 1982 the ECU was the most 
stable currency against both the Italian lira and the German mark. The 
study determined the ECU to be the second most stable currency against 
the dollar, the pound sterling and the Belgian fra nc. 
The Underpinnings of the Evolution Towards A Common European Currency 
The focus of this section is on the theoretical arguments and basic 
notivations underlying the process towards monetary unification and a 
European currency . Although a f ull assessment of the costs and benefits 
of monetary integration can hardly be worked . ou-t at the current stage of 
the process, the arguments fo r monetary unification can be isolated and 
explained. The internal dynamics fostering the move to economic and 
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monetary union is the desire to reach beyond a customs union and the 
simple freeing of movements of .goods , services, and factors of produc -
tion and create among member countr i es conditions that wi l l r emove~ 
bias against intra - community trade . 10 Underlying this move is the hope 
of preserving Europe as an island of stability and freeing it from the 
debilitating effects of shocks generated by economic systems outside the 
Common Market . 
The rationale for the drive towards monetary unification and 
economic integration , however , derives as much from internal as from 
external Community concerns . When the Community began in 1958, its 
member states sold 34 percent of their total exports to other member 
states . That ratio had risen to 53.3 percent by 1982.
11 
Such a shift 
indicates an increasing degree of intracontinental trade within the 
community. 
Monetary integration, as prescribed in the Treaty of Rome, has 
always been considered as a logica l and necessary step on the road to 
full economic union. Repeated currency crises since 1967 only shifted 
the emphasis from internal preoccupation towards a more externally 
oriented approach . Whereas internal Community building was the major 
driving force which inspired the proposals for monetary unification 
antedating the Werner ?:eport, it is Europe's position vis - a- vis the 
"outside " world, and the related loss of contro l over monetary affairs 
for internal stabilization purposes, which has created the major impetus 
in recent years . 
The European Attempt to Recover Monetary Control 
Economists from both sides of the Atlantic (e . g., Giovanni Magnifico , 
Robert Mundell , and Robert Triffin) agree that the most significant 
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advantage to forming a European Monetary Union i s that Europe can regain 
control of its mone_tary policy . 
Magnifico contends that the case for a common cu rr ency stems f r om a 
practical need for an international money and the unsuitab il ity of t he 
alternatives . Realistically , he points out that the dollar has become 
the dominant form of international money, and the Euro - do llar mark et has 
grown up primarily in response to the desire of those engaged in interna -
tional business to hold international money . 12 The Euro-do ll ar marke t 
has offered some advantages to Euro pe by constituting the nearest 
approach to a common European money and capital market. In such a 
capacity it has been a potent factor favoring financial in tegration 
within Europe. However, the fundamental drawback is that by being 
closely linked -to U. S . money markets it transmits American monetary 
policies to Europe. 
American monetary policy is understandably implemented to achieve 
U. S. domestic economic objectives. Quite often, the result of U. S . 
polic y being transmitted abroad i s monetary conditions ar e imposed on 
Europe that are strongly at variance with local conjunct ur al needs. 
Magnifico asserts that , "As long as the dolla r remains the in ternational 
money , any European country attempting to insulate itself from . American 
monetary policies will also in sulate itself from its European partne r s . 1113 
In light of cyc l ical factors , the size of the Amer ican economy , and 
the dominan t role of the U.S . dollar , the monetary policy of the Fede r al 
Reserve system can convey destabilizing economic impuls es worldwide . In 
the European case, as economies become more open they render themselves 
more vulnerable to the impact of American monetary policy. As the U. S. 
pursues discret i onary monetary and fiscal policies , the r est of its 
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trading partners are forced to accept directly or through the Euro-dollar 
market the consequences of its - policies. Expansionary policy usually 
results in a decline of U. S . market interest rates and an increase of 
funds to the Euro-dollar market. Such effects coupled with the real 
effects of an i ncrease in American demand for imports tends to produce a 
worldwide inflationary impact. On the other hand, restrictive policies 
generally drive U.S. domestic interest rates up, attract funds from the 
Euro -d ollar market, restrict world liquidity, and transmit recessionary 
effects abroaa. 14 
Furthermore, the erosion o·f a currency's purchasing power makes it 
increasingly inefficient at carrying out its crucial function in the 
domestic economy. When that currency is the established international 
money, the same costs and distortions that inflation creates in the 
domestic economy appear at the world market level. In this case, 
however, there is an additional cost since the international currency no 
longer provides a stable reference point against which other countries 
. a . 1· is can gauge their own omestic monetary po ices. 
Little gain will be produced by replacing the dollar with a 
European national currency as t he international money , since the country 
whose currency is selec t ed will naturally conduct monetary policy with a 
keener eye toward domestic rather than Community conditions. 
"International liquidity", which in the past has been determined by the 
supply of dollars, would most likely be drastically reduced. 
Robert Triffin elaborates further on world liquidity by suggesting 
that the "most sign i ficant debate concerning the evolution of an 
international monetary system is the inflationary proclivity of any 
reserve currency - convertible as well as inconvertible - enabling the 
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reserve currently center to finance huge and persistent deficits, inter-
nal and external, by flooding the world ' s reserves with its own 
I O U I II 16 • • . s • Triffin points out that world reserve creation between 
1973 and 1978, measured in dollars, tripled from $191 billion to $571 
billion. The $380 billion dollar increase was sustained at an average 
pace of 20% per year , much faster than any realized growth in world 
tr ade ana production in real terms. The implication Triffin makes is 
that the U.S. was allowed - even under floating exchange rates - what de 
Gaulle called the "extravagant privilege " of financing most of U.S. 
17 deficits by printing more dollars. Triffin further suggests that 
previous ~o the explosion in wor ld reserves domestic inflationary 
policies were sanctioned by balance of payments deficits and reserve 
loss8s. Such a process reduced the ability of in fla tionary countries to 
avoid a devaluation , or depreciation, of their currency. Either was a 
traumatic experience under a fixed exchange rates, because it revealed 
an obvious failure of official policies and exposed responsible officials 
to the danger of not being reappoined or reelected to their job. In 
recent years, daily floating rates have significantly re duced this 
trauma and the consequent political dete rr ent to persistent inflationary 
policies . Although floating rates speed up the readjustment of exchange 
rat es to competitive levels by more inflationary countries, they tend to 
18 
facilitate the continued pursuit of i nflationary policies by them. -
It can be concluded, then , that a primary motive for monetary 
integration is to set up a kind of common front against the monetary 
power of the United States: against "dollar imperialism". The eventual 
d~velopment of a common European currency will inevitably be , in part, 
th e result of the u.s. currency achieving the status of intervention 
12 
currency, unit of account, unit of quotation, reserve asse t, and an 
asset of settleraent in international affairs. Further, the rea lization 
that when t he currency of the U.S. fulfills such necessary roles, the 
fina ncial institutions which use and produce it are dominant will speed 
the acceptance of a European alternative. 
Therefore , the drive toward monetary integration should be viewed 
as an attempt to alleviate a situation in which Community countries have 
become commercia lly integrated with one another, but communicate mainly 
through the U.S. dollar. 
The Seigniorage Issue 
An inhere nt concern in the approach to full monetary union is the 
fear of a loss of national autonomy and sovereignty. Although the 
concept of seigniorage is di ff icult to quantify, there are several 
dimensions of gai n which Europe, in fac t, is . familiar with. Historically, 
seigniorage referred to the mint charge for turning gold or silver into 
money. Mundell asserts t hat in the modern context of paper money, the 
term can be used to refer to the command over resources which is acquired 
by the authority with the monopoly over the issuance of notes. 19 
Additionally, sergniorage gains can be identi fied as: the ability to 
finance balance of payments deficits by printing more of a currency; a 
less compelling need for ba l ance of paymen ts adjustments; reduced 
exchange risks for the vehicle currency re sidents; and the existence of 
denomination rents which accrue to the banking system having monopoly 
power ov e r the issuance of monetary liabilities denominated in the 
h . l 20 ve i ce currency. 
An incisive argument for a common European currency is that monetary 
institutions in the Community can recoup the seigniorage which is 
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presently accruing to the U.S . financial infrastructure . Thus, the 
seigniorage privilege, which may have slight significance in national 
states, acquires much greater political and economic importance when 
viewed in an international context. As monetary unification proceeds, 
and a common medium of exchange is devised, the prospect for strengthen-
ing European financial institutions and Community businesses will 
increase proportionately. When a common currency becomes a vehicle 
currency and the dollar is replaced, the benefits of a widely-based 
currency and the consequent diversification of services it provides will 
accrue to intra - E:uropean insti .tutions. 
To a degree, the ECU has begun to provide such benefits to European 
institutions. European Community countries other than Germany have been 
happy to let the ECU develop within their borders . Also, a growing 
amount of intra -Community trade - particularly firms dealing with French 
and Italian companies - is financed by ECU's. The Bank of Italy 
estimates that 10% of Italian foreign currency trade financing was in 
ECU's in 1982. Critics of monetary unification regard their monetary 
unit as a symbol of national sovereignty, and are apprehensive of 
progams which threaten that perceived sovereignty. The fear of losing 
national independence is probably the greatest obstacle to achieving 
monetary union. Such concerns emanate from the ancient tradition by 
which a nation's full exercise of sovereignty implies three essential 
activities: the administration of justice; the raising of armies; and 
the striking of coinage. In a world characterized by a high degree of 
interpenetration of economics and communication , the tradition has lost 
its substance and no longer conforms to reality. 
14 
The European Community. has communicated mainly through dollars. 
The argument again s_t monetary union due to the loss of national 
sovereignty is incon s istent in l ight of the loss of seignior~ge 
1 b . . d b h . 
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present y e1ng exper1enc e y t e Community. The fragmentation of 
money and capital markets reduces the control of national central banks 
over the domestic money supply, re nders its policy less powerful, and 
subjects nations to the vicissitudes of U.S . monetary authorities. 
A common European currency would restore sovereignty to European 
governments as more control over their own economies is gained. Also, 
such a unit would facilitate a better international arrangement of 
instruments and policies to promote more efficient monetary management 
of the world economy. 
Increased Efficiency Resulting from 
Simpler Transfers and Calculations 
Transactions take time and a common transaction unit lowers not 
only the cost of search but the cost of negotiation. In the case of 
currencies, the greater the multiplicity of transactions a currency can 
perform the ~ore economies of sca l e that can be exploited with a common 
money. 
Mundell has expressed the relationship as follows: 
Because of economi es of scale, wi th respect to the use 
of currency, the production of services emanating from 
the use of a given money for transactions purposes is 
cheaper the larger the size of the transactions domain 
and the longer the common money has been used. Because 
memory itself is a capital asset in the production of 
information an increased frequency of repetition of contact 
slows depreciation of memory (forgetting), the cost 
function will tend to obey learning-by-doing la~ 2, based simultaneously on spatial and temporal factors. 
As the EEC countries decide to irrevocably fix exchange rates between 
their currencies, the risks of fluctuations in the balance of payments 
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of each individual country is pooled. The result would be a definite 
economy in the foreign reserves that would be needed by ·the group as a 
whole. In addition, there will be further economies in the case of 
holding foreign reserves because all trade done between .countr ie s of the 
new currency area - which was previously considered foreign tra de - .will 
now be internalized. In additio n to economizing on the amount of 
foreign reserves a nation needs, a common currency will provide further 
gains from the elimination of the transaction costs associated with the 
h f 
. 23 exc ange o currencies. 
Other benefits from the formation of larger currency areas and a 
more efficient use of money would be the possibility of a reduction in 
exchange risks for firms caused by speculation. The benefits from 
reduced exchange risks have been a strong argument in favor of fi xed 
,._ f . 24 excuange rates or some tl.Ille. The benefits of the elimination of 
intra-EEC exchange risks becomes greater when it is realized that the 
majority of trade is intra- Community and thus trade r elations and 
payments would approximate conditions similar to those appl ying to 
movements of goods within one country. The ability to eliminate 
de-stabilizing specula tion may well depend on the confidence of complete 
commitment to monetary union. If there is ge neral confidence that an 
ar r angement of fix ed exchange rates is in place permanently, and that 
the political will is sufficient to maintain a viable monetary union, 
then the benefits from reduced exchange risks and disrupting speculation 
can accrue to the union. 
Increased efficiency in . monthly and short-run settlements between 
central banks and the European Monetary Cooperation Fund (EMCF) will be 
fac ilitated also with a single Community currency. The present function 
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of the ECU is to allow for more simplified transfers in the unit of 
account instead of transfers of foreign exchange. The EMCF was created 
by the Council of Ministers in April of 1973 with the task of promoting: 
(1) the progressive narrowing of the margins of fluctuations of the 
Community currencies against one another; (2) interventions in Community, 
currencies on the exchange markets; and (3) settlements between central 
banks. Consultation and discussion on these areas should lead to a 
concerted policy on reserves. 
Some of the desired benefits began to materialize with the entry 
into force of the European monetary system on March 13, 1979. Originally 
the EMCF served basically as a clearing agency for the "snake" operations 
between Community participants and as the administrator of the short - term 
monetary support facility. However, the EMCF was authorized to "receive 
monetary reserves from the monetary authorities of the member states of 
the Community and to issue ECU's against such assets. 1125 The ECU issued 
by the EHCF is now used as one means of settlement between monetary 
authorities of the Corr.munity. member countries and for transactions 
between those authorities and the EMCF. 
The central banks which are participating in the exchange rate and 
intervention mechanism of the EMS deposit with the EMCF 20 percent of 
their gold holdings and 20 percent of their gross reserves in U.S. 
dollars against the issue of ECU's by the EMCF. The gold deposits are 
to be valued at the average market price of the six previous months. To 
the extent that change in gold and dollar values occur, central banks 
will make necessary adjustments to maintain deposits of at least 20 
percent of these reserves with the EMCF. At the same .time, the amounts 
of ECU' s issued will be adjusted for changes in the valuation of gold or 
changes in exchange rates. 
17 
The short-term credit facility established in 1970 among central 
. . 
banks of the . Corranunity, widened to cover three adjoining members in 
1973, has been maintained in the EMS. A "very short-term facility" of 
an unlimited amount has been established for the financing of 
intervention debts and claims. Such claims and interventions in EMS 
currencies are converted into ECU's at daily values and entered in the 
banks of the European Monetary Cooperative Fund. Interest on such 
claims is determined by the average discount rate of Community central 
banks. 
Increased efficiency in transfers should also result from the 
established mechanics for the settlement of claims and debts between 
central banks. A debtor central bank must first use any assets it holds 
in the currencies of creditor central banks. However, since central 
banks of Community members usually hold only working balances in the 
currencies of other member countries, debtors have the right to settle 
50 percent of their remaining debts in ECU's. The other 50 percent may 
be settled in ECU's only if this is acceptable to creditors. 
Therefore, efficiency and, indeed, econoQies of scale can be 
realized through a common European currency such as the ECU. Co~.reunity 
countries can benefit as their central banks and the EMCF connect their 
monthly and short-run settlements in a currency that will go as far as 
possible without being forced into exchange dealings or translation. 
The private sector also stands to gain from a more stable exchange 
rate environment. The elimination or reduction of l arge parity changes 
will facilitate long-term planning for investment and economic growth, 
while minimizing the costs of destabilizing speculation. 
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The Elimination of Traditional Balance of Payments Problems 
Through Increased Capital Mobility 
The meaning of a "deficit" or "surp lus" in a balance of payments 
has changed dramatically since the advent of floating exchange rates. 
The traditional measures of a balance of payments imbalance were des i gned 
to spotlight evidence of pressure on a country's exchange rate. The 
pressure was measured by transactions which were forced on government 
"to settle" the imbalance. Such measures were known as compensatory. 
Thus, the "official-reserve-transactions" measure of the surplus or 
deficit highlights specific government transactions to fund the imbalance 
and protect the exchange rate from changing . · An imbalance on a "n et 
liquidity basis " is a slightly broader measure to focus attention on the 
26 same basic phenomenon. 
In a floating-rate world the traditiona l deficit measures no longer 
necessarily indicate pressure on exchange rates since the rates are 
fluctuating constantly . Instead , the traditional measures are s ignifi-
cantly influenced by unusual capital movements, such as payments on oil 
to O?EC countries, selective government intervention in the foreign 
exchange markets to stabilize or change the level of exchange rates, and 
profit motivated investment by central banks of countries such as Saudi 
. . . . 27 Arabia in foreign government securities. 
The decade of the 70 ' s forced other realizations as well on the 
internal monetary system, one being that few, if any, of the world's 
trading partners are willing to tailor domestic stabilization policies 
to the demands of balance of payments problems, i.e., external balance. 
Japan, Germany, and the U.S. have pursued domestic policy goals that 
often have been inconsistent with balance-of-payments equilibrium. A 
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widely held view is that Japan and Germany have been able to maintain a 
balance of payments surplus as. the resu l t of continuous internal 
policies which have avoided excessive increases in money supply and the 
rate of i nr°lation . By extension, the conclusion is reached that the 
U.S. balance of payments deficit has been attributable to excessive 
increases in the money supply and the rate of inflation. It is only 
very recently that a strong U. S. do l lar has been r esponsible for 
American trade deficits . 
The above situation helps to focus upon how increased capital 
mobility and centralization of the control of the EEC' s money supply can 
reduce balance of payments problems, and exchange rate tensio n between 
Community members when a common currency is operational. The benefits 
to accrue to the Community reflect the theory inherent in the optimum 
currency area literature . According to Mundell , the definition of such 
h . f b ' l' 
28 
an a r ea inges upon actor mo i ity. Mundel l asserts that the optimum 
domain of a monetary union exists when there is full mobility of factors 
of production between the regions it comprises; in this way, 
international factor movement s can substitute for changes in regional 
exchange rates . McKinnon and Kenan refer , on t he other hand, to 
elements of economic structure. McKinnon classifies , for analytical 
purposes, the goods produced by a country into tradable and non- t r adable 
goods. He argues that: "The optimal currency ar rangements may be to peg 
the domestic currency to the body of non - tradable goods (i.e. , goods 
produced domestically , and imported) and change the domest i c prices of 
tradable goods (i.e. , good produced domestical l y , and exported) by 
a l tering the exchange rates to improve the t r ade balance. 1129 
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While McKinnon stresses the degree of economic openness, Kenan 
emphasizes diversification. "· •.. diversity is a nation's product-mix, 
the number of single product regions contained in a single country may 
be more relevant than labor mobility •.• , a well diversified national 
economy will not have to undergo changes in its terms of trade as often 
. 1 d . ·1 -30 as a singe-pro uct nationa economy. 
Regardless of how such an area is optimally defined, with regard to 
the European Community, the balance of payments problem would become 
regional rather than national. Since exchange rate changes would be 
ruled out, and no barriers would exist for capital mobility, other 
measures would be used to correct intra-Community imbalance. Such 
measures , as James Meade's model suggests, must focus on the two main 
31 performance criteria of internal and external balance. Internal 
balance refers to some combination of full Bmployment and price 
stability, while external balance is considered to be an equilibrium in 
the balance of the payments. Generally, authorities have at their 
disposal either expenditure increasing or decreasing policies {monetary 
and fiscal policy), or expenditure switching measures which include 
exchange rate variations, trade and capital restrictions, as well as 
exchange controls. In this context, a commitment to fixed exchange 
rates would mean the loss of a policy instrument. However, with the 
advent of a common cur:::-ency such as the ECU, and the operation of EFMC 
as a central bank, monetary policies would be coordinated in such a way 
to achieve internal priorities throughout the CoITID1unity "region". Such 
monetary harmonization would ultimately lead to greater fiscal policy 
consultation between community members to remedy prob l ems of less 
competitive regions. This implies that fiscal policy may become the 
single most important policy instrument at a nation's disposal. 
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To facilitate the harmonization mentioned above, the E.MS contains 
both a Short-Term Monetary Support facility (STMS) and a Medium-T erm 
Financial Assistance facility (MTFT). The STMS provides for credits to 
the central banks of Community members for the financing of temporary 
balance of payments deficits . Credits ar e granted without economic 
po licy conditions, but they trigger subsequent consultations. Credits 
have a duration of three months originally with the possibility of 
renewal for another three months. The STMS is available to all member 
countries, and each has . a "debtor quota " (borrowing .ceiling) and a 
"creditor quota" (commitment ceiling), the latter being twice as high as 
the former to safeguard the viability of the system under varying 
distributions of payments imbalance s among member countries.
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The MTFA facility provides credits to any member country in "d iffi -
culties or seriously threatened with difficulties as regards to its 
balance of payments ." Credits under this program will be extended for 
two to five years and will be subject to economic policy ccnditions to 
be laid down by the Council of Ministers. In formulating conditions and 
monitoring the performance of a debtor country, important advisory roles 
are assigned to the European Commission ond the Community ' s Monetary 
Committee. The MTFA has creditor ceilings but no debtor ceilings for 
member countries, and provides for "refinancing from outside the system 
if necessary by concerted action of member states with other interna-
. l . . ,.33 tiona organizations. 
Therefore , in theory and in practice the European Communit y 
countries can benefit from the reduced balance of payments tensions as 
the goal of a common European currency becomes a reality. The resolu-
tion which established the EMS states the intention "to ensure the 
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lasting success of the EMS through policies conducive to greater 
stability at home and abroad for both deficit and surplµs countries. 1134 
Furthermore, a strong emphasis has been placed on the convergence of 
economic policies to achieve both equity and economic growth. Steps 
must be taken to strengthen the economic base of less prosperous 
countries of the community due to the national loss of some control over 
their own economy . Indeed , such a long-term commitment to stability 
will benefit the European Community as well as the international 
monetary system. 
Conclusion and Thoughts On the Future 
Edmund Burke, one of Europe's most perceptive author - statesmen, 
made the statement: "All government , indeed every human benefit and 
enjoyment, every virtue and every prudent act is founded on compromise 
and barter." If such a concept is heeded by the participants of the 
European Monetary System, then the Common Market countries may well be 
on their way to the much-heralded Monetary Union . Europe stands at a 
crossroads - politically, of course - but also at a crossroads to decide 
the future of the European Monetary System. To some extent the doll ar 
standa rd lies behina. To the left and right, national currency areas 
exist with flexible exchange rates. Ahead, lies the path to a common 
currency and economic and monetary solidarit y among the European 
Community countries . 
For more than three decades Europe has huddled for re lief under the 
umbrella of a friendly America. The dollar has served as a vehicle 
23 
currency for European integration - an anchor . If this system returns 
it will perpetuate _a growing U.S. balance of payments deficit, increas-
ingly undermine the Eur opean drive for monetary independence, diminish 
her economic power , and most likely return America to an era of protec -
tionism and controls. What is necessary , above all, is a transformation 
of attitudes in Europe: a shift away from the concept of a competitive 
national interest and rivalry; a shift away from the idea that there is 
time to spare , and that integration will still be possible two or three 
decades from now. A political will and consciousness must demonstrate 
that European independence is worth saving. The current costs from lost 
sove rei gnty, reduced moneta ry cont rol and complex currency transactions 
are more than the cost of some lost national independence . 
If political cooperation can be aci1ieved, and the rising costs of 
monetary dependence recognized, the European Monetary System has a good 
chance of survival. This is not because it is a flawless system, or 
because its participants all attach the same significance to monetary 
discipline, but because such a la r ge percentage of each country's trade 
is with fellow members of the EEC. Thei r common interest demands 
reasonable stable exchange rates. It seems appropriate then to ask, 
"S ince exchange rates are being managed anyway , why shouldn ' t EEC 
countries manage them together?" 
Currently the ECU is the linchpin of the European Monetary System . 
The deve lop ment of the role of the ECU has reach ed a stage where there 
is a need for information and careful ana lysis of the present situation. 
The swift growth of ECU deposits and the nearly $2 billion in ECU 
denominated bond issues makes such discussions imperative if the 
momentum is to be sustained. 
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Recently , Yves Le Portz, President of the European Investment Bank , 
reported on the gro wing use of . ECU' s in what he termed the "private ECU 
circuit ". He stated that almost the entire range of banking se r v i ces 
can be offered in ECU's. The services inc l ude: (1) accepting deposits 
in ECU' s ; (2) gr anting l oans for various t erms (3) fina nc i ng fo r eign 
trade i n ECU' s; and (4) even the opt i on of ECU denominated savings 
accounts exi sts . 
As the ECU has become an instrume nt of se t tlement and sav in g , the 
private s ector has begun to recognize and accept the ECU as a currency. 
As the money and capital markets continue utilizing the ECU the 
advantages of a common un i t of exchange will be substantia t ed . 
The next step is to remove exchange contro l s that prevent Community 
resident and institutional investo r s f r om investing i n ECU denominated 
bnnds . Such action wil l undoubtedly lead to greater political 
a~ceptance of the ECU and enhance the prospects fo r a truly common 
European cu r rency . 
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